When analysing the tactics of this match, it’s clear that breaking it down into the first and second halves is crucial. How could a single substitution lead to such a dramatic transformation?
The Starting Formation: A Slightly Evolved 4-2-3-1
Anyone who watched the first half might have questioned Arne Slot’s entire philosophy. Liverpool’s backline wasn’t fully settled, and the personnel on the pitch wasn’t the ideal combination (Konate’s ability is certainly superior to Quansah’s, but his poor form from the end of last season seems to have continued through pre-season). Compared to pre-season, Slot made a minor adjustment at the start, shifting from a system where the two No. 6 in the 4-2-3-1 stayed back to organise, to one where Macca operated as a b2b midfielder.
This small tweak wasn’t surprising; I had already seen hints of it when we saw the 4.5-man press in the pre-season. More importantly, it’s something Slot favoured and was comfortable with during his time at Feyenoord.
However, Slot underestimated Ipswich’s pressing intensity—or more precisely, the speed and physicality of their press.
The First Half: 3+2 Build-up vs. Different Pressing Approaches
Many noticed the disjointed nature of Liverpool’s first-half performance, but that’s only the surface issue. The real problem was Liverpool’s 3+2 or 4+2 build-up directly facing Ipswich’s 4+2 press. Ipswich pushed their two central midfielders forward to press, giving them both numerical superiority and faster pressing speed. Slot’s strategy of inviting pressure to then break through the lines was completely foiled, leading to misplaced passes or long balls. While there were occasional successes, the game remained evenly matched at best.
In contrast, Ipswich’s backline also used a 3+2 build-up, but Liverpool’s 4+1 (with Macca) setup didn’t give them a numerical advantage either. Ipswich didn’t gain much from this, but we must note that Slot’s teams don’t play direct football after winning back possession, making Liverpool’s counter-pressing look ineffective in the first half.
As for Quansah, losing one duel was just a symptom. Frankly, apart from being completely beaten by Delap, he didn’t do much wrong. However, Konate outperformed him in every aspect a little bit. Don’t underestimate that “little bit” —Konate’s quicker recovery pace allows him to push higher up the pitch. In this situation, Slot prioritised keeping a clean sheet over intricate passing from the back.
The Second Half: Elite-Level Adjustments
A rational coach shouldn’t be disheartened by the first half. The first question in their mind should be, how long can Ipswich maintain such intense pressing? The coaching staff remained clear-headed, understanding that as long as they didn’t concede, Ipswich’s intensity would drop, leading to the most crucial adjustment of the game.
The key change at halftime was Szobo’s positioning. His deeper role transformed Liverpool’s build-up from being outnumbered 3+2 to matching Ipswich’s press 3+3.
Konate’s introduction ensured this side could win more duels, handling Delap’s pace and physicality with ease. Once Liverpool could win the ball back consistently, Szobo’s deeper position became a game-changer, allowing him to influence the game from various positions—whether on the wing, as a No. 10, or as a deep-lying midfielder.
TAA and Konate played crucial roles, especially TAA, whose defensive focus improved significantly after reducing his involvement in midfield. Salah’s relentless runs also broke the deadlock. However, if we had to pinpoint one decisive factor in the second-half turnaround, it would be Szobo’s adjustment. This wasn’t just a compromise between a 4-2-3-1 and a 4-3-3; it almost fully inherited Klopp’s system from last season.
Conclusion: Lingering Concerns
The issue remains that in the Premier League, you’ll always face intense pressing—sometimes for 45 minutes, sometimes for 70. You can’t expect a revolutionary improvement in your build-up play, nor can you rely on your opponents failing to score first. Strengthening the long ball is one approach, but the coaching staff should consider adjusting the number of players at the back based on the opponent’s pressing style. In matches like this, Szobo should have been given a similar role from the start.
Another significant concern is set-piece coaching, which could become a bigger issue. I understand the strategy of crowding the box with inswingers, but clearly, leaving players on the edge of the area and at the corners of the box isn’t enough. This is a glaring vulnerability.
As we look forward to the match against The Bees this weekend, it’ll be interesting to see if the coaching staff remains consistent in their tactical demands. Lastly, let’s hope to see a strong performance from Fabio.